In this study, the authors investigated the understanding of other's actions in 5 adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). A human demonstrated an attempt to open different containers. Each container required a different motor pattern to open it. Along with the container, a 2nd object was made available. After a free play period in which the chimpanzees' natural behaviors toward the objects were recorded, the authors tested the following 2 phases: The demonstrator (a) tried but failed to open and (b) opened the container successfully, with I of 2 alternative strategies, either using an "irrelevant tool" or by hand. The chimpanzees did not reproduce the demonstrator's motor patterns precisely but did reproduce the demonstrated strategies in both phases. These results suggest that chimpanzees anticipate the intentions of others by perceiving the directionality and causality of object(s) as available cues.
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Recently, there has been much controversy over whether non human animals imitate. Comparative psychologists have argued that imitation has important implications for the biological and phylogenetic foundations of cognitive complexity. Much of this debate centers on how the act of imitation is defined (e.g., Byrne & Russon, 1998; Byrne & Tomasello, 1995; Galef, 1988; Heyes, 1993, l995; Heyes & Galef, 1996; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Visalberghi & Fragaszy, 1990; Whiten, 1998; Whiten & Ham, 1992) . However, it has proved difficult for researchers to agree on a definition of imitation and to decide which nonhuman animals can imitate.
In attempting to determine whether the capacity for imitation exists in animals, comparative psychologists should consider it from another point of view. The question that must be asked is, how do imitators understand what the demonstrator did? In other words, how does the imitator represent the actions of others? If we see another's actions as a series of precise physical movements (e.g., right arm moves up 20 cm, knees bend 30°, etc.), we might be very puzzled and unable to predict what the other is doing. It is clear that humans extract some component elements from the Masako Myowa-Yamakoshi and Tetsuro Matsuzawa, Department of Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Primate Research Institute, Kyoto Univer sity, lnuyama, Japan.
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actions of others within a psychological framework (e.g., intention, desire; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Fodor, 1983; Tomasello, 1996) . From this cognitive perspective, researchers must determine what com ponents of the actions the imitators process.
In humans, nonverbal tests provide suggestive evidence that infants as young as 14 to 18 months old understand something about the intentions of others (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, l998; Meltzoff, 1995) . Meltzoff investigated the understanding of others' intentions in LS-month-old infants. He took advantage of the natural human tendency to reproduce the actions of others called the behavioral re-enactment procedure. This procedure capitalizes on an infant's natural tendency to imitate adults' ac tions. In this experiment, infants watched the demonstrator try but fail to reach the end state of an action (e.g., he tried to pull the ends of a dumbbell outward, but his hands slipped off). After the demonstration, when given an opportunity to manipulate the object themselves, the infants could achieve the end state of the actions spontaneously. They actually achieved success as often as infants who saw a successful demonstration (i.e., the end state of the action) and more often than infants in other control conditions. Meltzoff concluded that 18-month-old infants are able to represent the actions of others in a psychological framework through the body movement used to achieve an underlying goal or intention.
Little is known about how nonhuman animals understand the actions of others. Some researchers have attempted to demonstrate that apes understand something of the intention of others. Premack and Woodruff (1978) published the first study on a chimpanzee's understanding of others' intentions. A language-trained chimpan zee named Sarah observed several problem-solving situations fea turing a human actor on videotape. For example, Sarah watched a video of an acto. r looking up at an out-of-reach banana hanging from the ceiling. After that, she was shown a pair of photographs, one of which pictured the solution (e.g., the actor climbed on a box under the banana). Sarah successfully chose the correct alterna tives well above the level of chance. Premack and Woodruff argued that Sarah could attribute intention to the human actor.
Recent experimental research on apes' understanding of others' actions has focused on discrimination between intentional and accidental actions (Call & Tomasello, 1998; Povinelli, 1991; Po vinelli, Perilloux, Reaux, & Bierschwale, 1998; Premack, 1986) . However, the results have been both positive (e.g., Po. vinelli, 1991; Call & Tomasello, 1998) and negative (e.g., Povinelli et al., 1998; Premack, 1986) . It is not evident whether or how apes distinguish intentional from accidental actions performed by others. These researchers focused on determining whether nonhuman apes can distinguish intentional actions from accidental actions in a dichot omous fashion. Moreover, the results may be interpreted in several ways: (a) Chimpanzees have developmentally limited cognitive skills; (b) the result depends on their history of interacting with humans, including language training; or (c) there exist salient setting cues for each defined action in apes that differ from the humans' perspective.
Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa ( l 999) investigated the fac tors that determine the degree of difficulty in chimpanzees' (Pcm iroglodytes) imitation. We found that there are some constraints in the. basic cognitive processes required to transform visual infor mation into matching motor acts when chimpanzees imitate human actions. For example, chimpanzees are less sensitive to body movement than to the manipulated objects involved in the dem onstrated actions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that 18-month-old human infants understand the mental states of others through body movement (Butterworth, 1994; Meltzoff, 1995) . If chimpanzees have a limited capacity for processing visual-motor information as it relates to body movement, their capacity to understand intentions of others may be different from that of humans.
Our aim in the presern study was to investigate how chimpan zees represent the action of a human demonstrator. This is the first study to explore the understanding of others' actions with the use of a nonverbal completion procedure (such as the one Meltzoff, 1995, used) to formulate action plans based on chimpanzees' interpretation of the performance. We focused on the structure of the demonstrated actions to find what kinds of cues are available for chimpanzees to understand the intentions of others. The action was designed to involve various motor patterns and strategies for manipulating objects as independent variables. We expected that the chimpanzees would pick up some information from the dem onstrator's actions in ways that differed from those of humans.
To begin with, chimpanzees observed a demonstrator who tried but failed to perform the intended actions. Then, the chimpanzees saw the demonstrator achieve the intended actions successfully (Experiment I). The hypothesis was that chimpanzees would un derstand something about the intention of the demonstrator de pending mainly on the information about how the objects can be used (strategies for manipulating objects), even though the dem onstrator's action failed. In this respect, the results would be different from those of humans who read the intention of others through their body movements.
Expe1iment 1

Method Subjects
The subjects were S female chimpanzees from 12 to 20 years old housed at the Kyoto University Primate Research Institute (KUPRJ). Ai (20 years old at the time of this study) was born in the wild. Pendesa ( 18 years) and Chloe (IS years) were born in captivity and have been reared by humans since they were less than I year old. Popo (13 years) and Pan ( 12 years) are full siblings that were born through artificial insemination and raised in a nursery by humans at KUPRl starting within 24 hours of birth because their biological mother did not exhibit sufficient maternal care. All of the chimpanzees live together in a community of 11 chimpanzees in a semi natural environment enriched with u·ees and a su·eam. They were nm deprived of food for testing. Before this experiment, the chimpanzees had participated in different perception and cognitive capacity experiments involving a variety of objects (Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1990; Kojima, 1990 : Matsuzawa, 1985 Matsuzawa, Kojima, & Shinohara, 1997; Tanaka, 1995 : Tomonaga, 1993 and in a task that involved reproducing several kinds of actions (Kojima, 1991; Myowa-Yamakoshi & Matsuzawa, 1999) . Throughout this study, all the chimpanzees paid attention 10 the actions demonstrated by the human. Then, when they were handed the objects, they remained in one place and manipulated the objects with great interest.
Test Materials
Eight pairs of objects were used as test stimuli (see Appendix, Table  A I ). In each pair, one object was a container that required one of a variety of different motor panerns to open (pushing, pulling, or twisting), and the other was an itTelevanl tool that was not required to open the container. With each of these eight pairs of objects, opening the container was considered a successful action. No food was needed to sustain the interest of the chimpanzees.
Experimental Design
Each chimpanzee participated in a total of eight experimental sessions: one session was conducted with each pair of objects. Each session con sisted of two phases of demonstrati. on: (a) The demonstrator tried but failed to open the container because one of his hands "slipped" off the pan of the container to be opened (failure phase), and (b) the demonstrator success fully opened the container (success phase). ln both phases following each demonstration, the chimpanzees were given a chance 10 interact with the objects. Each of them experienced the two phases in the above-stated order (we did not counterbalance the order of the two phases in this study because we primarily focused on chimpanzees' understanding of the in tention of the demonstrator).
In each success and failure phase, the demonstrator manipulated the container with one of two alternative strategies: trying to open the con tainer (a) with the irrelevant tool or (b) by hand. We counterbalanced the subjects 10 examine the alternatives within each phase and session (see Figure I ).
Procedure
Each chimpanzee was rested individually in a familiar playroom (5. 0 x 7.2 m with a ceiling at 3.0 m) at KUPRI. There were two experimenters. One demonstrated the actions by sitting face to face with the chimpanzee in the playroom. The other experimenter recorded the trials on videotape from outside the room through an acrylic panel. All the chimpanzees had previously learned to sit quietly on a wooden seat whenever they panicipared in a cognitive test. Each session started with free play followed by the two rest phases.
Free play. A pair of objects was presented to the chimpanzee for approximately 3 min of free play. During this time, rhe subject interacted in some way with each of the two objects. The demonstrator then retrieved the objects and proceeded with the following two phases (see Figure 2) .
Failure phase. The demonstrator showed an action in which he tried but failed 10 open a container using one of rwo alternate strategies, either with the itTelevant tool or by hand. Each action was demonstrated two or three times 10 each chimpanzee lo ensure thar she paid attention 10 the {a) (b) action. After the demonstration, the chimpanzee was then given the pair of objects and allowed 3 min to manipulate them. After 3 min elapsed, the objects were retrieved, and the chimpanzee received a piece of food in exchange for the objects. No further verbal description or encouragement was provided.
Success phase. After the failure phase, we proceeded with the success phase: The demonstrator showed the chimpanzee how to open the con tainer successfully with one of the two alternate strategies. Following this demonstration, the chimpanzee was given the pair . of objects and allowed another 3 min lO manipulate them. The procedure in the success phase was identical to that followed in the failure phase, except that the demonstrator succeeded in opening the container.
One session consisted of f r ee play and the two phases of the imitation test. There were four sets of conditions (failure with the irrelevant tool, failure by hand, success with the irrelevant tool, success by hand) in a total of eight sessions. Each session incorporated two of the four conditions. The order of conditions in each phase was counterbalanced across the subjects.
Each chimpanzee participated in two sessions each day, 3 or 4 days a week. Even if the chimpanzees successfully opened the containers in the free play period, we conducted both subsequent testing phases. All the testing sessions were recorded on videotape (Sony, CCD-TR3000) in their entirety for larer analysis.
Data Analysis
During free play before the two testing phases, the chimpanzees often spontaneously opened the containers. Jn all cases, they opened the con tainers by hand, not by using the irrelevant tool. We excluded the cases of these successes in free play from further analysis. We analyzed only the sessions in which the chimpanzees failed to open the container in the free play period and observed the experimenter's demonstration in the follow ing two test phases.
As for the period of chimpanzees' manipulation observed in the free play period and the two phases, we defined a pe1for111c111ce as starting when the 
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Figure 2. Experimental procedure in Experiment I.
chimpanzee touched the object(s ) and ending when contact with the ob ject(s) ceased, whether or not the container was opened. ln addition, we defined the categories of motor patterns for chimpanzees' performances. Each performance was coded according to mutually exclusive categories. A vocabulary for motor patterns was coined and is listed in Table I . Using these definitions, we idemified 18 motor pattern categories in total. Chimpanzees' spontaneous performances in free play were excluded from further analysis. As a result, we identified 29 performances in the failure phase and 33 performances in the success phase. Each of the chimpanzee's performances were analyzed with regard to the strategies used to manipulate the container-specifically, whether the chimpanzee manipulated it alone or with the irrelevant tool.
Scoring
Two independent observers were initially given the definition of a performance and received a list of 18 identified motor pattern categories (see Table I ) . Then, the performances for each session (25% of the cases for eight sessions) were presented 10 the observers in random order. They noted whether the container was manjpulated alone or with the ir r elevant tool in each session. At the same time, they determined on the basis of the list which motor panerns they thought the chimpanzees were performing. The observers were unaware of the hypotheses being tesr. ed and free to choose any of the strategies for each performance regardless of any previous nominations. lnterobserver agreement on the performances cal culated using the kappa statistic (designed to correct for chance agreement ) was high, k = .83, p < .01. Table 2 lists the performances of each chimpanzee for all sessions in each phase and the mean latency from first touch to opening the container in free play. In 4 out of 19 cases, the chimpanzee successfully opened the container after observing the demonstrator.
Results
Successful Performances
In the failure phase, the chimpanzees successfully opened the containers in 2 cases ( I I% of a total of l 9 cases). Pan opened the container using a different strategy from that previously shown by the demonstrator. Ai opened the container using the demonstrated strategy. Both chimpanzees opened the containers by hand. The latencies to their f"mt opening the containers were 9.8 s (Pan, Session 3) and 8.7 s (Ai, Session 6).
ln the success phase, excluding the 2 cases in which chimpan zees had already opened the container in the preceding failure phase, they succeeded in opening the container in 2 of 17 cases (12%). Both chimpanzees reproduced the demonstrated strategy.
The latencies to open the container were 26.2 s (Ai, Session 2) and 9.4 s (Chloe, Session 4).
There were no clear differences between the chimpanzees' suc cesses in the failure and success phases. When they succeeded in opening the container in either of those phases, the latency was much shorter than the mean latency for the cases in which the same container was opened in free play (Sessions 2, 3, 4, and 6, M = 109, 77, l07, and 63 s, respectively). The chimpanzees did not engage in extensive trial and error; rather, they opened the con tainer directly.
There were no performances in which the container was directed toward the tool in the two phases; the chimpanzees always ma nipulated the tool alone or directed it toward the container.
Reproducing the Strategy for Manipulating Objects
We analyzed the performances in each phase from two perspec tives. Fir t, did the chimpanzees manipulate the container with the irrelevant tool or by hand? Second, did they use the demonstrated strategies? In other words, when the demonstrator manipulated the container with his hands, did they also manipulate the container with their hands without using the irrelevant tool? When the demonstrator manipulated the container using the irrelevant tool, did they also m<1nipulate the container using the irrelevant tool? Table 3 shows the frequencies of performances by subjects for each type of demonstration in both phases. We found that chim panzees used the demonstrated strategy significantly more often than an alternative strategy: Wilcoxon signed rank test, T(N = 5) = 0, p < .05, 72% in the failure phase; T(N = 5) = 0, p < .05, 88% in the success phase (see Figure 3) . However, the difference in the alternative strategies in the failure phase versus the success phase was not significant: T(N = 4) = 5, ns. Move container with the other object on top aside with hands or feet. Attach the other object to container with hands or feet. Push part of container using the other object held in hand. Container is touched by the other hand. Hit container with the other object held in hand.
Insert the other object into a hole in container with the hand. Press container against the floor with the other object held in the hands. Container is on the floor. Pull at part of container using the other object held in hand. Container is touched by the other hand. Stick the other object into pan of container with hands. Rub container with the other object held in hand in continuous contact. Another object is placed flat on the smface of container. Hold container and the other object with hands or feet. Both objects are lifted. Give container and the other object to the demonstrator with hands or feet. Turn container using the other object held in the hands. Touch container and the other object with hands or feet. Both objects are on the !loor. Twist container using the other object held in hand. Container is held in the other hand.
Nore. The motor patterns are listed according to the order of frequencies in the subjects' performances.
In the success phase, the demonstrator used either the identical or a different strategy to open the container as he used in the failure phase. As an example of the latter, the demonstrator manipulated the container with his hands in the preceding failure phase and used the irrelevant tool in the success phase (also see Figure 2) . No difference was found in the choice of strategy used between both cases: T(N = 5) = 5, ns. The chimpanzees significantly tended to use the demonstrated strategy, irrespective of whether the demon strator used the same strategy in both phases. Table 4 presents the proportion of the performances reproduced by the chimpanzees in each demonstrated motor pattern in each phase. Wilcoxon's signed rank test showed that there was no significant difference in the proportion of reproduction of the motor patterns between the two phases: T(N = 4) = 3, ns; M = 17% in the failure phase; M = 15% in the suc�ss phase. As for the proportion of reproduction of each type of motor patterns, the Friedman test showed that there was no significant difference among the three types, x2(2, N = 5) = 6.23, ns; pulling, M = 9% in Sessions 1, 4, and 7; pushing, M = 27% in Sessions 2, 3, 6, and 8; twisting, M = 0% in Session 5. The chimpanzees did not accurately reproduce the motor patterns involved in the demon strator's actions in both phases.
Reproduction of Motor Patterns
Discussion
The results show that the chimpanzees reproduced some aspects of the demonstrated actions in the failure and success phases. They manipulated the objects using the demonstrated strategy significantly more often than other strategies. Even though they saw the demonstrator fail to open the container, they tried to use the strategies demonstrated in the failure phase. On the other hand, they did not appear to reproduce precisely the demonstrator's body movements involved in the demonstra tions in both phases.
Experiment 2
In Experimeqt 2, we presented the sets of objects during free play and then tested the chimpanzees using the order of success phases followed by failure phases. The hypothesis was that once chimpanzees had seen the demonstrator succeed in the success phase, they would understand how to open the container. As a result, even though the demonstrator showed the alternative strat egy in the later failure phase, chimpanzees would not try the strategies demonstrated in the failure condition, which would differ from the results of Experiment 1. Failure Phase
Success Phase 
Method Subjects
The subjects in Experiment 2 were the same 5 chimpanzees who were tested in Experiment I.
Test Materials
Four other pairs of objects were used as test stimuli (see Appendix, Table A2 ). In each pair, one object was a container, and the other was an irrelevant tool that was not required to open the container.
Procedure, Data Analysis, and Scoring
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment I but differed in the order of presentation of the failure and success phases. Each chimpan zee participated in a total of four sessions. One session was conducted 
Success Phase
Figa. re 3. Percentage of performances ( + SE) in which the chimpanzees performed using the identical strategies shown by the demonstrator in both phases in Experiment I .
with each pair of objects. After the free play period, the experimenter first demonstrated the success phase and then the failure phase. Fur thennore, in the success phase followed by the failure phase, the demonstrator showed alternative strategies. That is, two demonstrated conditions existed: trying to open the container (a) with the irrelevant tool in the success phase and by hand in the failure phase, or (b) by hand in the success phase and with the irrelevant tool in the failure phase. The order of the conditions in each session was counterbalanced. All sessions were videotaped.
The tapes were analyzed by the same method in Experiment I. Exclud ing performances that the chimpanzees spontaneously did in free play, we identified 37 performances in the success phase and 38 performances in the failure phase in total.
lnterobserver agreement by two independent observers of the perfor mances calculated using the kappa statistic was high, k = .89, p < .0 I.
Results
Successful Pe,formances
There was only one case in which the chimpanzees could open the containers in the success and failure phases. Jn the success Nore. The first number in parentheses represents the number of the performances that subjects reproduced from the observed motor patterns. The second number represents the total numbers of subjects' pe1formances in three types of sessions.
phase, 1 chimpanzee, Pan, successfully opened the containers by hand (7% of a total of 15 cases). Pan opened it using the strategy that had previously been shown by the demonstrator. The latency to open the container was 42 s (Session l).
Reproduction of the Strategy or Manipulating Objects
Table S illustrates the frequencies of chimpanzees' perfor mances for each rype of demonstration in the success and failure phases as a function of the strategies shown by the demonstrator. We found that the chimpanzees used the demonstrated strategy significantly more often than an alternative strategy in the success phase: Wilcoxon's signed rank test, T(N = 6) = 0, p < .OS, 97% in the success phase.
On the other hand, in the failure phase, the chimpanzees signif icantly used the strategy that had previously been shown in the success phase in both conditions: T(N = 5) = 0, p < .OS, 92% in the failure phase. No difference was found in the choice of strategy between two conditions in the two phases: T(N = 4) = 6, ns, in the success phase; T(N = 3) = 4, ns, in the failure phase. The chimpanzees significantly tended to use the demonstrated strategy in the success phase, even though they saw the alternative strate gies in the failure phase. Figure 4 presents the percentage of performances in which the chimpanzees performed using identical strategies shown by the demonstrator in both phases. There were no performances in which the container was directed to the tool; the chimpanzees always manipulated the tool alone or directed it toward the container.
Discussion
There were few successes in which the chimpanzees could open the containers after observing the demonstration in the two test Table S phases. However, the chimpanzees reproduced some aspects of the demonstrated actions only in the success phases. When the chim panzees saw the demonstrator succeed in opening the comainers, they used the identical su· ategy in the success phase. On the other hand, once they had seen the demonstrator succeed, chimpanzees did not use the alternative strategy demonstrated in the failure phase.
Experiment 3
In previous experiments, the chimpanzees produced a few more actions in the failure and success phases compared with the free play condition. The findings suggest that the chimpanzees bene fited from the demonstrator's action in the two phases. However, the longer the chimpanzees manipulated the containers, the more likely they would be LO discover how Lo open them. In Experi ment 3, we explored the effect of extended practice on the chim panzees by presenting some sets of objects in a free play situation that lasted as long as the combined free play, failure, and success phases.
Method Subjects
The subjects in Experiment 3 were the same 5 chimpanzees who were tested in Experiments l and 2.
Test Materials
Four additional pairs of objects were used as rest stimuli (see Appendix, Table A3 ). In each pair, one object was a container, and the other was an irrelevant tool that was not required to open the container.
Frequency of Types of Pe,formances Used by Chimpanzees After the Demonstrator Auempled 10 Open the Con1ainer in Each Phase
Demonstrator's manipulation 
Procedure
Each chimpanzee participated in a total of four sessions; one session was conducted with each pair of objects. Each session consisted of three phases of free play. A pair of objects was presented 10 the chimpanzees for approximately 3 min of free play in each phase. During this time, they interacted in some way with each of the two objects. The demon strator then retrieved the objects and gave a piece of food to the chimpanzees in exchange for the objects. This procedure was repeated two times.
Results and Discussion
There were seven cases in which the chimpanzees opened the containers. When they succeeded in opening the containers in Experiment 3, the mean latency to open them was within 3 min. ff a chimpanzee had failed to open the container in the first free play period, she did not open it in the later two free play periods (3 minutes X 3 times). These results of Experiment 3 indicate that extended practice to manipulate the containers did not affect the later opening of containers.
General Discussion
How Do Chimpanzees "Understand" Demonstrated Actions?
In this study, we used a completion procedure to investigate whether chimpanzees understand the intentions of other indi viduals. Expeiiment I showed that the chimpanzees were rarely able to open the containers in the failure phase (less than l l % of total cases). Overall, there was no clear difference in the success of actually opening the container between the failure and success phases. The chimpanzees did not appear to be more successful, even after being shown how to open the container.
How might we interpret the results of Experiment I? Did the chimpanzees understand any of what the demonstrator tried LO impart? There are two possible hypotheses. One is that the chim panzees already understood something about the intention of the demonstrator in the failure phase. The other is that the chimpan zees could not understand the demonstrator's intention, even after observing the outcomes of the demonstrated actions.
Although the chimpanzees did not open the container very often after observing the demonstration, when they did open it, they reproduced the demonstrated strategy in both phases in Experi ment 1. Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa ( 1999) found that chimpanzees were less sensitive to imitating a demonstrator's body movements compared with imitating the manipulations of the objects involved in the demonstrated action. Therefore, although the chimpanzees might have understood the demonstrator's inten tion in the failure phase, it might be difficult for them to actually reproduce opening the container from the view of an all-or-none issue.
These results could be easily explained in terms of simple stimulus enhancement, in which seeing some act done on a par ticular object would increase the observer's probability of inter acting with that object (Spence, 1937) . However, when we com pare the results of Experiments I and 2, we can rule out stimulus enhancement as an explanation. Chimpanzees tried to complete the demonstrator's alternative strategies in success phases when they could not have understood how to open the containers in failure phases (Experiment l ). On the other hand, once they had seen the demonstrator succeed in success phases, they did not try to follow the demonstrator's alternative strategies in failure phases (Exper iment 2). Chimpanzees seemed to understand that there was no need to try alternative strategies because they already knew how to open the container from the success phases. They learned from the demonstrator some causal relationships between the tools used to open the containers or the containers to be opened in the action. (Tomasello, 1990) . Namely, these findings would seem to go beyond stimulus enhancement.
Moreover, the fact that the chimpanzees produced a few more actions in the failure and success phases compared with the free play could be explained as an effect of extended exposure to the containers. However, this explanation seems unlikely in light of the findings of Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, we presented chimpanzees sets of objects in a free play situation that lasted as long as the combined free play, failure, and success phases in the first two experiments. Even so, the mean latencies from the first contact with the containers to opening them in Experi ment 3 were not different from those of free play in Experi ments I and 2,
We concluded that the chimpanzees understood something about the intention of the demonstrator in the failure phase. How ever, they mainly observed the directionality of objects as cues rather than the demonstrator's body movements (i.e., pulling, pushing, and twisting). In that sense, chimpanzees may interpret other's actions in different ways from humans. For that reason, our results dif 
Role of Body Movement in Understanding the Actions of Others
It is fruitful to compare our results with previous studies in which researchers investigated chimpanzees' understanding of the intentions of others. These studies have produced both positive and negative results. We will review the tasks used in each study to determine what kind of cues lead chimpanzees to understand others' intentions.
As mentioned above, Myowa-Yamakoshi and Matsuzawa (1999) suggested that chimpanzees might not be sensitive to the details of the body movements of others. Chimpanzees may have more difficulty than humans in understanding gestures consisting of only body movements (see also Call & Tomasello, l99 5, for examples involving orangutans). This view is congruent with the negative results of experiments in which the subject was required to discriminate between another's intentional and accidental actions. Povinelli et al. (1998) reported that 5-to 7-year-olcl chimpan zees did not understand the distinction between accidental and intentional actions. In our view, this seems reasonable. The acci dental and intentional actions Povinelli et al. studied had physi cally equivalent outcomes (e.g., the actor's hand touched the cup, and the juice in the cup spilled on the floor). The only difference between the two actions was the actor's body movements defined from a human perspective (e.g., the actor intended to pour a cup of juice slowly, or the actor accidentally spilled it). We suggest that it was difficult for chimpanzees to distinguish these actions be cause they paid more attention to the information in the physically equivalent outcomes than to the actor's body movements.
The same interpretation may be applied to the study by Toma sello, Call, and Gluckman (1997) . Young children (2.5 and 3.0 years old), chimpanzees, and orangutans observed a human exper imenter hide a reward in one of three opaque containers on a wooden plank. Another experimenter played the role of commu nicator and helped the subject find the reward using one of three signs: pointing, marker, and replica. Pointing involved placing a hand directly above the correct container with the index fmger oriented clown. Marking was when a wooden block was placed on top of the correct container. Replica involved holding up a dupli cate of the correct container. The results showed that young children understood all three communicative signs above the chance level. On the other hand, apes that were not previously trained to use the marker and pointing strategies did not score above chance for any of the intentional communicative signs. Tomasello et al. (1997) argued that the naive apes did not under stand the communicated intentions of others. However, although the naive apes all performed at the chance level, their best perfor mance was with the marker, followed by the replica and pointing. This result is also consistent with ours, because the apes may have responded to the containers and objects (marker and replica) held by the communicator rather than to the co111municator's body movement (pointing).
We investigated whether chimpanzees could understand a dem onstrator's intention without seeing the outcome of the actions. The results suggest that chimpanzees do not understand others' intentions in the same way that humans do. Human infants under stand the intentions of others in a psychological framework through body movements. On the other hand, chimpanzees anticipate the forthcoming action of others by perceiving the direction ality and physical causality of objects as a more available cue compared with the details of the body movements of the demon strator performing the manipulation. In our task, we can only speculate whether it is more difficult for chimpanzees to distin guish between actions that have the same outcome or body move ments to understand another's intentions.
In the present ·study, we used a completion procedure to show that chimpanzees can understand another's intentions. In the pub lished studies on whether chimpanzees understand the intention of others, there may have been different levels of task difficulty. The constraint on visual-motor information processing may have pro duced mixed results regarding the ability of chimpanzees to un derstand intention. Whereas humans interpret another's intentions by perceiving both body movements and the directionality of manipulated objects, chimpanzees depend mainly on the informa tion about the manipulated objects to anticipate the intentions of others.
